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Could the United States Win a War Against Europe?

  • 1 day ago
  • 5 min read

A hypothetical comparison of the US and European Armed Forces




Contemporary conflicts show us exactly how it would start. The US would first launch cyber operations against military networks. They would then move to satellite

disruption. 


After GPS degradation and command-and-control disruptions, the US would then move to undermine coordination. They would no doubt do this beforehand through psychological means, but now we’re talking about cutting physical ties. 


Whether that be severing communication, forcing the capitulation of a member state, or just bombing the hell out of the leadership wherever possible. 


Littoral Gains


After disrupting strategic harmony, the US would then attack both blue-water and littoral assets to bring some of their larger heavy hitters into play. And yet, this is no simple feat. No small part due to EU subs like the Dolphin or the Blekinge


This delay would limit their cruise missile capabilities by increasing their standoff distance and reducing their reach.  


Essentially, the Scandinavian littorals would be risky waters. While the deep Atlantic would hold lurking French Barracudas. Neither of which threat is easy to pacify without tremendous risk. 


This is another reason the US fleet deployment would be cautious at best. Far from their procedures in Iraq, Panama, and even Venezuela. For instance, as we speak, the US fleet is maintaining a safe distance in Iran; this is due to Iran's coastal defence force, which is comprised of heavily armed PT boats. 


These boats can easily swarm blue water navies. But this would require extreme bravery, the likes of which we haven’t seen in this century. Nonetheless, the US is not gambling with its trillions or troops. 


Europeans, however, do not rely on zealotry and swarm tactics, but rather on layered, capable defence (A2).



Anti-Access (A2)


Anti-Access (A2) is an integrated approach to denying your adversary theatre access. In other words, it’s the art of killing someone before they get to you or the things you like. 


A2 is something any invading army has to come to terms with before even considering landing their terrestrial assets. 


Like many others, the EU A2 involves multiple lines of defence and redundancies:


I) Long-Range Missiles

  • Anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs)

  • Land-based anti-ship cruise missiles

  • Long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems


II) Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS)

Layered radar + missile networks that overlap coverage:

  • Early warning radars

  • Long-range SAMs

  • Medium-range systems

  • Point-defense batteries


III) Submarine & Mine Warfare

  • Diesel-electric submarines are extremely effective in littoral waters.

  • Naval mines are cheap and devastating.

  • Maritime chokepoints become lethal.


IV) ISR Dominance (Eyes Everywhere)

  • Satelites

  • Over the Horizon Radar

  • Drones and maritime patrol aircraft


Using these layered assets, A2 buys time by exposing the enemy to risk. This isn’t unlike a castle in which the exterior of a castle is no man's land, whilst walls and moats force the enemy to take perilous paths in their bid to kill you. 


Like the passe castle strategy, A2 forces an enemy to bring specialised equipment. This also slows them down and makes them vulnerable. The vulnerability forces them to pool their assets, which is far from ideal in a hyperwar. 


If you accumulate assets, you're only inviting missiles and destruction. For instance, an invasion fleet the likes of WWII would be a juicy target no nation could afford to lose. This is why 1940 invasion fleets don’t exist today. They can’t hide and therefore will be bonked. 


Fairweather Bases


What would the EU do while its navy and strategic assets were assailed off coast? 


First, the Europeans would certainly attempt to capture strategic NATO bases. This would give them more options and fewer vulnerabilities.  


Bases like Rammstein would be assailed by German artillery and Main Battle Tanks, whilst smaller bases would be overrun by light infantry. 


If US forces were still stationed in the bases, they would be isolated and targeted. 


These troops would be like a cut-off airborne division. Except, ideally, airbourne can melt into the landscape, keeping the enemy guessing. Whereas these support troops at these bases have nowhere to go. They would be sitting ducks, cut off, calling out, and outgunned by heavy armour.  


Divisions like the 10th Armoured (10 Panzer Division) would squeeze these bases into submission. Especially considering they would have close air support, while the USAF would still be concerned with clearing fighters, far from Rammstein. 


Furthermore, the US's first choice of bases or footholds would not be something so far inland like Rammstein. So they would ideally gut what they had and crater the runways if possible. 


Overrunning these would strip the United States of its most valuable assets in the EU. And force them to operate from bases in the Middle East. It would also make coastal invasion a nightmare, albeit not impossible. 


Boots on the Ground

 

Boots on the ground would be asinine in the opening stages of war. It would be almost impossible for the US to land forces and organise them into companies in time for a counterattack. 


European assets and tank columns would punish anything that trickled inland, while anti-ship missiles and mobile cruise missiles would shower the supporting vessels in penetrating ordnance. 


However, the more the EU A2 is stripped back, the closer the fleet can move, and the more viable a landing operation becomes. 


Gaps in the Old World


The EU’s current defence strategy leans on its biggest ally, the United States of America. The EU has operated under the assumption that the US soft-power hegemony relies on their participation and therefore would protect them in a crisis. 


Recent political events have rocked this assumption to its core. And it has uncovered some gaping holes in the EU defence. 

We can get a glimpse of where the EU feels deficient in its new military projects, focusing on strategic autonomy across multiple domains. 


Next-generation air combat platforms like the UK‑Italy‑Germany Tempest/GCAP fighters, the Franco-German Main Ground Combat System tank program, expanded artillery and propellant production, integrated air and missile defence networks, and EU-wide battlefield command-and-control and secure communications systems all fill many roles that American assets already cover. 


This has less to do with fear and more to do with strength. Sure, they would love for America to lend a hand if need be, but they don’t want to feel solely reliant on them either. 


Europe is also developing space-based ISR, satellite communications, and early-warning systems to partially replicate U.S. missile detection and intelligence capabilities, while France is expanding its nuclear umbrella to bolster deterrence. 


Despite these efforts, Europe still lacks U.S.-scale strategic lift, comprehensive ballistic missile defence, and advanced electronic warfare, meaning full parity remains a long-term goal rather than an immediate reality.


And who knows where US weapons will be when the EU finally catches up. 


Could the United States Win a War Against Europe?


The United States could paralyse the EU’s ability to defend its coasts and annihilate strategic opposition. However, the US could not invade or annex Europe without crippling its ability to defend itself. Even with its immense advantages in manoeuvre warfare. On land, the American forces would have to contend with not only powerful armoured assets and close air support systems, but partisans as well. 


Their expanded supply lines would be incredibly vulnerable. And they just don’t have the numbers to passify the three million troops they’d face at the onset. That's not even considering what Europe could draft – so to speak. 


Luckily, none of this will happen because Europe and North America have more to gain from friendship than from war. In 2024, the bilateral trade was valued at 1.7 trillion dollars. 


Compare this to the war in Iraq, where they lost 3 trillion dollars, and you can see why even power brokers would scoff at such a fruitless endeavour.


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